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ABSTRACT
In ownership-based access control frameworks with the possibility
of delegating permissions and administrative rights, chains of del-
egated accesses will form. There are different ways to treat these
delegation chains when revoking rights, which give rise to different
revocation schemes. Hagström et al. [8] proposed a framework for
classifying revocation schemes, in which the different revocation
schemes are defined graph-theoretically; they motivate the revoca-
tion schemes in this framework by presenting various scenarios in
which the agents have different reasons for revocating. This pa-
per is based on the observation that there are some problems with
Hagström et al.’s definitions of the revocation schemes, which have
led us to propose a refined framework with new graph-theoretic def-
initions of the revocation schemes. In order to formally study the
merits and demerits of various definitions of revocation schemes,
we propose to apply the axiomatic method originating in social
choice theory to revocation schemes. For formulating an axiom,
i.e. a desirable property of revocation frameworks, we propose a
logic, Trust Delegation Logic (TDL), with which one can formalize
the different reasons an agent may have for performing a revoca-
tion. We show that our refined graph-theoretic definitions of the
revocation schemes, unlike Hagström et al.’s original definitions,
satisfy the desirable property that can be formulated using TDL.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
K.6.5 [Management of Computing and Information Systems]:
Security and Protection
Keywords
delegation, revocation, trust, logic, access control
1. INTRODUCTION
In ownership-based frameworks for access control, it is common
to allow principals (users or processes) to grant both permissions
and administrative rights to other principals in the system. Often
it is desirable to grant a principal the right to further grant permis-
sions and administrative rights to other principals. This may lead
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to delegation chains starting at a source of authority (the owner of
a resource) and passing on certain permissions to other principals
in the chain.
Furthermore, such frameworks commonly allow a principal to
revoke a permission that she granted to another principal. De-
pending on the reasons for the revocation, different ways to treat
the chain of principals whose permissions depended on the second
principal’s delegation rights can be desirable. For example, if one
is revoking a permission given to an employee because he is mov-
ing to another position in the company, it makes sense to keep in
place the permissions of principals who received their permissions
from this employee; but if one is revoking a permission from a user
who has abused his rights and is hence distrusted by the user who
granted the permission, it makes sense to delete the permissions of
principals who received their permission from this user. Any algo-
rithm that determines which permissions to keep intact and which
permissions to delete when revoking a permission is called a revo-
cation scheme. Revocation schemes are usually defined in a graph-
theoretical way on the graph that represents which authorizations
between the principals are intact.
Hagström et al. [8] have presented a framework for classifying
possible revocation schemes along three different dimensions: the
extent of the revocation to other grantees (propagation), the effect
on other grants to the same grantee (dominance), and the perma-
nence of the negation of rights (resilience). Since there are two
options along each dimension, there are in total eight different revo-
cation schemes in Hagström et al.’s framework. This classification
was based on revocation schemes that had been implemented in
database management systems [7, 6, 2, 3]. The framework’s design
decisions are carried over from these database management sys-
tems and are often not fully motivated. Furthermore, the behaviour
of the revocation schemes is dependent on the conflict resolution
policy of the system, which is not integrated into the framework.
We identify a number of problems with Hagström et al.’s frame-
work and the definitions of the revocation schemes included in
the framework. This motivates our refined framework, in which
the conflict resolution policy is integrated into the framework, and
in which the graph-theoretic definitions of the revocation schemes
have been modified.
In order to avoid that our refined framework turns out to have
undesirable properties like those we identified in Hagström et al.’s
framework, we propose to formally study the merits and demerits
of various definitions of revocation schemes using the axiomatic
method originating in social choice theory. Which behaviour is
desirable for a revocation scheme depends on the reasons for per-
forming the revocation. So in order to formulate an axiom, i.e. a
desirable property of revocation schemes, we propose a logic, Trust
Delegation Logic (TDL), with which one can formalize the differ-
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ent reasons an agent may have for performing a revocation. We
show that our modified graph-theoretic definitions of the revoca-
tion schemes, unlike Hagström et al.’s original definitions, satisfy
the desirable property that can be formulated using TDL.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2,
we discuss related work, giving an overview of Hagström et al.’s
framework as well as of the conflict resolution policies proposed in
the literature. In Section 3 we motivate and define a refinement to
Hagström et al.’s framework. In Section 4, we consider the diverse
reasons for revocating on some example scenarios, and sketch how
these reasons can be used to formulate the desirable behaviour of
the revocation schemes. In Section 5, we motivate and define Trust
Delegation Logic (TDL). In Section 6 we illustrate how the scenar-
ios discussed in Section 4 can be formalized in TDL. In Section 7
we use TDL to formally formulate a desirable property for revoca-
tion frameworks, which our revocation framework satisfies. After
discussing possible further work on the topic of this paper in Sec-
tion 8, we conclude the paper in Section 9.
2. RELATED WORK
Hagström et al. [8] have introduced three dimensions according
to which revocation schemes can be classified. These are called
propagation, dominance and resilience:
Propagation. The decision of a principal i to revoke an autho-
rization previously granted to a principal j may either be intended
to affect only the direct recipient j or to propagate and affect all the
other users in turn authorized by j. In the first case, we say that the
revocation is local, in the second case that it is global.
Dominance. This dimension deals with the case when a princi-
pal losing a permission in a revocation still has permissions from
other grantors. If these other grantors’ revocation rights are depen-
dent on the revoker, the revoker can dominate over these grantors
and revoke the permissions from them. This is called a strong re-
vocation. The revoker can also choose to make a weak revocation,
where permissions from other grantors to a principal losing a per-
mission are kept.
Resilience. This dimension distinguishes revocation by removal
(deletion) of positive authorizations from revocation by issuing a
negative authorization which just inactivates positive authorizations.
In the first case another principal may grant a similar authorization
to the one that had been revoked, so the effect of the revocation does
not persist in time. In the second case a negative authorization will
overrule any (new) positive permission given to the same principal,
so its effect will remain until the negative permission is revoked.
We call a revocation of the first kind a delete or non-resilient revo-
cation, and a revocation of the second kind a negative or resilient
revocation.
Since there are two possible choices along each dimension,
Hagström et al.’s framework allows for eight different revocation
schemes.
Delegation frameworks that allow issuing negative authorization
can bring about a state in which a conflict may arise. If a princi-
pal is granted both a positive and a negative authorization for the
same object, then we say that these two authorizations conflict each
other. A system’s conflict resolution policy determines how to re-
solve such a conflict. Here is a list of possible conflict resolution
policies as described by Ruan and Varadharajan [11]:
Negative-takes-precedence: If there is a conflict occurring on
the authorization for some object, the negative authorizations will
take precedence over the positive one.
Positive-takes-precedence: Positive authorizations from i to
j take precedence over negative authorizations from k to j for all
k 6= i. This means that a negative authorization from i to j directly
inactivates only positive authorizations from i to j, and leaves other
permission to j active.
Strong-and-Weak: Authorizations are categorized in two types,
strong and weak. The strong authorizations always take precedence
over the weak ones. Conflicts among strong authorizations are not
allowed. In conflicts between weak authorizations negative ones
take precedence. Note that the intended meaning of strong and
weak in this policy differs from their meaning in Hagström et al.’s
dominance dimension.
Time-takes-precedence: New authorizations take precedence
over previously existing ones. Note that this policy will make neg-
ative authorizations non-resilient.
Predecessor-takes-precedence: If the principal i delegates (pos-
sibly transitively) some right to principal j, then authorizations is-
sued by i to some other principal k concerning that right will take
precedence over authorizations issued by j to k. In other words, the
priority of subjects decreases as the privilege is delegated forward.
Hagström et al. assume the system to have either a negative-
takes-precedence or a positive-takes-precedence conflict resolution
policy. Note that under a negative-takes-precedence policy, a nega-
tive revocations on principal k dominates all positive authorizations
to k, so that the difference between weak and stron negative revo-
cations disappears.
3. REFINING THE REVOCATION FRAME-
WORK
In this section we first analyze some problems with the revoca-
tion framework by Hagström et al. [8]. While analyzing the prob-
lems, we already informally sketch how we propose to solve them.
Next we define a refined revocation framework in which all of these
problems have been solved.
3.1 Problems with Hagström et al.’s framework
(1) In Hagström et al.’s framework, strong global revocations
will propagate forward dominating over all the existing delegation
chains, making them even stronger than desired. We illustrated this
by an example:
EXAMPLE 1. User A issues an authorization to users B and
C. B also grants this authorization to C. If a strong global delete
revocation (in Hagström et al.’s sense) is performed over the au-
thorization from A to B, then the authorization A granted to C is
also deleted. But since A granted this authorization to C indepen-
dently from B, it seems unjustified to delete it (Hagström et al. give
no motivation for this behaviour).
(2) In Hagström et al.’s framework, the choice of a conflict reso-
lution policy is not incorporated into the revocation framwork, even
though it affects the behaviour of the dominance dimension. We
extend the dominance dimension to incorporate the choice of how
to resolve conflicts between positive and negative authorizations in
the revocation framework. In our refined framework, there are three
choices along the dominance dimension:
• weak: The principal performing the revocation only dom-
inates over direct authorizations granted by herself, autho-
rizations from other grantors are kept intact.
• predecessor-takes-precedence (p-t-p): The principal per-
forming the revocation dominates over other grantors’ au-
thorizations that are dependent on her.
• strong: The principal performing the revocation dominates
over all other grantors’ authorizations.
Note that we now use the terminology from conflict-resolution
policies as presented in [11] and in Section 2 for the choices on the
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dominance dimension. Hence “strong” now has a different mean-
ing than in Hagström et al.’s framework: As long as Hagström et
al.’s framework is combined with a positive-takes-precedence pol-
icy, the strong revocations in their framework have the same force
as our p-t-p revocations. The strength of our strong revocations can
only be achieved in Hagström et al.’s framework by combining it
with a negative-takes-precedence policy.
It is not desirable to allow all users who have a delegation right
to perform strong revocations. Hence we include in our framework
the possibility for a principal to grant to another principal a special
right to perform strong revocations to other users.
(3) In Hagström et al.’s framework, delete revocations are sup-
posed be non-resilient, which according to Hagström et al. means
that “another user may issue the same permission that was just re-
voked, and the effect of the revocation disappears”. This property
fails to be satisfied in global deletion revocations, as illustrated by
this example:
EXAMPLE 2. User A issues an authorization to user B, and B
further grant this authorization to C. If A deletes the authoriza-
tion given to B, then the authorization from B to C is also deleted.
Reissuing the authorization from A to B will not re-instate the au-
thorization from B to C as before the revocation.
To avoid this problem in our framework, when a delete is per-
formed, we do not delete the forward chain, but just inactivate it.
(4) Hagström et al. motivate the distinction between delete and
negative revocations mainly through the notion of resilience as de-
fined in Section 2. However, in weak revocations there can be no
difference between a resilient and a non-resilient revocation, since
a weak revocation does not affect authorizations issued by others
than the revoker. They motivate the usage of weak negatives by
pointing out that they are useful for temporary revocations. But
since in our framework the forward chain does not get deleted in a
delete revocation (see point (3)), a delete can also be easily undone,
so that a delete revocation is a sensible choice even when the revo-
cation is likely to be only temporary. Hence we do not need weak
negative revocations.
Furthermore, p-t-p and strong deletes would have undesirable
effects, as illustrated by the following example:
EXAMPLE 3. User A issues an authorization to user B, and
gives user C the right to perform strong revocations. User C per-
forms a strong delete on B, removing without traces the authoriza-
tion provided to B by A. Later A realizes that C cannot be trusted
to perform strong revocations, and takes away B’s right to do so.
Even though C can no longer perform strong revocations, the effect
of his strong delete persist: B does not have the right originally is-
sued to him by A until someone issues a new authorization to him.
Hence we do not have a p-t-p or strong delete revocation in our
framework, but instead have the distinction between a resilient and
a non-resilient negative for p-t-p and strong revocations.
To conclude, if the dominance of a revocation is p-t-p or strong,
there are two options along the resilience dimension, non-resilient
and resilient. But if the dominance is weak, there is no choice along
the resilience dimension, and the revocation is characterized as a
“weak delete”. So there are five possible choices to be made along
the dominance and resilience dimensions: weak delete, p-t-p non-
resilient, p-t-p resilient, strong non-resilient, and strong resilient.
(5) Hagström et al. do not allow negative authorizations to be
inactivated. The reason they give is that they “do not want a revo-
cation to result in a subject having more permissions than before
the revocation”. However, the deletion of negative authorizations
is allowed, even though it may have the same effect. We do allow
negative authorizations to be inactivated, but the only kind of re-
vocation that can result in a subject having more permissions than
before is a revocation of someone’s right to perform strong revoca-
tions, and in this case this is a desirable property.
3.2 The refined framework
Let S be the set of principals (subjects) in the system, let O be
the set of objects in the system and let A be the set of access types.
For every object o ∈ O, there is a source of authority (SOA), i.e.
the manager of object o.
For any α ∈ A and o ∈ O, the SOA of o can grant the right to
access α on object o to other principals in the system. Secondly, the
SOA can delegate this granting right further. Thirdly, the SOA can
grant the right to perform strong revocations and to delegate this
right further. Accordingly we have three permissions: access right
(A), delegation right (D) and strong revocation right (S). We as-
sume that delegation right implies access right. The set {A,D, S}
of permissions is denoted by P.
Additionally to positive authorizations (+), our framework ad-
mits four different types of negative authorizations, p-t-p resilient
negative (−PR), p-t-p non-resilient negative (−PN), strong resilient
negative (−SR) and strong non-resilient negative (−SN). The set
{+,−PR,−PN,−SR,−SN} of authorization types is denoted by T.
DEFINITION 1. An authorization is a tuple (i, j, α, o, τ, pi, t),
where i, j ∈ S, α ∈ A, o ∈ O, τ ∈ T, pi ∈ P, t ∈ Z.
The meaning of an authorization (i, j, α, o, τ, pi, t) is that at time
point t principal i has granted to principal j an authorization of
type τ for permission pi concerning access type α on object o. We
assume that all authorizations in the system are stored in an autho-
rization specification. There is no interaction between the rights of
principals concerning different access-object pairs (α, o). For this
reason, we can consider α and o to be fixed for the rest of the paper,
and can simplify (i, j, α, o, τ, pi, t) to (i, j, τ, pi, t).
Since delegation right implies access right, an authorization
(i, j,+, D, t) can only be issued if an authorization (i, j,+, A, t)
is also issued. By taking the contrapositive, the connection is re-
versed for negative authorizations: For τ 6= +, an authorization
(i, j, τ, A, t) can only be issued if an authorization (i, j, τ,D, t) is
issued.
We visualize an authorization specification by a labelled directed
graph, as in Example 4, in which A is the SOA. For every authoriza-
tion (i, j, τ, pi, t) in the authorization specification, this graph con-
tains an edge from i to j labelled τ, pi, t. We refrain from showing
the authorizations that can be implied to exist by the rules specified
in the previous paragraph.
EXAMPLE 4. An authorization specification
A B C
D E
+, D, 2
+, S, 9
+, A, 1
+, D, 6
+
, D
, 4 +
, A
, 5
+
, D
, 8
A negative authorization can inactivate other authorizations in
the authorization specification. Which authorizations get inacti-
vated by a negative authorization depends on which type of nega-
tive authorization it is. There are three basic ideas governing the
inactivation of authorizations: Firstly, non-resilient authorizations
can only inactivate previously issued authorizations, whereas re-
silient authorizations can also inactivate authorization issued after
the negative authorization. Secondly, a strong negative authoriza-
tion from i to j inactivates every positive authorization from some
175
principal k to j, whereas a p-t-p authorization from i to j only
inactivates an authorizations from k to j if k is dependent on i.
Thirdly, any authorization that is no longer connected back to the
SOA through active authorizations is inactivated.
In order to formally specify which authorizations get inactivated
when issuing a negative authorization, we simultaneuosly define
the notions of an authorization being active and an authorization
being directly inactivated in Definitions 2 and 3.1 The auxiliary
notion of a directly inactivated authorization captures the idea of
an authorization from k to j being inactivated by a strong negative
authorization from i to j.
DEFINITION 2. An authorization (i, j, τ, pi, t) is active if it is
not directly inactivated and there are principals p1, . . . , pn, pn+1
and integers t1, . . . , tn satisfying the following properties:
(i) p1 = SOA, pn = i, pn+1 = j and tn = t;
(ii) for 1 ≤ l < n there is an authorization (pl, pl+1,+, pi′, tl)
that is not directly inactivated, where pi′ = S if either
τ ∈ {−SR,−SN} or pi = S, and pi′ = D otherwise;
(iii) there do not exist l,m with 1 ≤ l ≤ m ≤ n and an autho-
rization (pl, pm+1, τ ′, pi′′, t′) such that pi′′ = pi and τ = +
if m = n, and pi′′ = pi′ otherwise, and such that either
τ ′ = −PN and t′ > tm or τ ′ = −PR.
DEFINITION 3. An authorization (i, j,+, pi, t) is directly inac-
tivated if there is an active authorization (k1, j,−SR, pi, t1) or there
is an active authorization (k2, j,−SN, pi, t2) with t2 > t.
A principal j has the right to access of type α on object o
iff j is the SOA or there is an active authorization of the form
(i, j, α, o,+, A, t) or (i, j, α, o,+, D, t). j has the right to perform
strong revocations concerning action α on object o iff j is the SOA
or there is an active authorization of the form (i, j, α, o,+, S, t).
Strong negative authorizations towards the SOA are disallowed.
In Definition 4, we define the ten revocation schemes of our re-
fined framework. We use W, P, S, L, G, N, R and D as abbrevia-
tions for weak, p-t-p (predecessor-takes-precedence), strong, local,
global, non-resilient, resilient and delete respectively. Note that
when defining the revocation schemes, we do not need to specify
which of the authorizations get inactivated, because Definition 2
already tells us what to inactivate. Hence we just specify which
authorizations get added and/or deleted.
DEFINITION 4. Let i, j be principals, and pi ∈ {A,D, S}.
• A WGD revocation for permission pi from i to j at time t con-
sists of deleting any authorization of the form (i, j,+, pi, t′).
• For δ ∈ {P,S} and ρ ∈ {N,R}, a δGρ revocation for permis-
sion pi from i to j at time t consists of issuing the negative
authorization (i, j,−δρ, pi, t).
• For (δ, ρ) ∈ {(W,D), (P,N), (P,R), (S,N), (S,R)}, a δLρ re-
vocation for permission pi from i to j at time t consists of
deleting and adding the same revocations as in a δGρ re-
vocation from i to j, and – if pi is D or S – additionally
adding an authorization (i, l, τ, pi′, t′) for every authoriza-
tion (j, l, τ, pi′, t′) such that pi′ = S if pi = S, and pi′ is
either D or A if pi = D.
Since delegation right implies access right, a revocation for per-
mission A can only be performed if the corresponding revocation
for permission D is performed at the same time.
1These definitions inductively depend on each other. They should
be read as an inductive definition with the well-founded semantics
[5]. In Appendix A we discuss some of the issues resulting from
the inductive interdependence of these definitions.
3.3 Examples of revocations
Here are three examples for different revocations from B to C on
the authorization specification from Example 4. Examples for the
other seven revocation schemes of our framework can be found in
Appendix B. In all examples, we show the effect of simultaneous
revocations for permissions A and D. In order to illustrate better
the difference between resilient and non-resilient revocations, we
show the state of the authorization specification after C reissues the
previously issued authorization to D after the revocation.
EXAMPLE 5. Weak Local Delete revocation from B to C
A B C
D E
+, D, 2
+, S, 9
+, A, 1
+
, D
, 4 +
, A
, 5
+
, A
, 1
1
+
, D
, 8
+, D, 8
(a)
active
(b)
inactive
EXAMPLE 6. P-t-p Global Non-resilient revocation from B to C
A B C
D E
+, D, 2
+, S, 9
+, A, 1
+, D, 6
−PN, D, 10+
, D
, 4 +
, A
, 5
+
, A
, 1
1
+
, D
, 8
EXAMPLE 7. Strong Global Resilient revocation from B to C
A B C
D E
+, D, 2
+, S, 9
+, A, 1
+, D, 6
−SR, D, 10+
, D
, 4 +
, A
, 5
+
, A
, 1
1
+
, D
, 8
4. REASONS FOR REVOCATING
Hagström et al. have motivated the variety of revocation schemes
by sketching various scenarios in which the principals performing
the revocation have different reasons for revocating, so that differ-
ent behaviour of the revocation is desirable. In order to study the
desirable behaviour of the various revocation schemes, in this sec-
tion we first present some scenarios, which we use to illustrate the
different reasons the revocator has to perform the revocation, based
on her level of trust or distrust towards the revokee. Having pre-
sented the scenarios, we informally sketch how we want to define
the desirable behaviour of the various revocation schemes. These
ideas will be formalized in subsequent sections.
4.1 Four scenarios
SCENARIO 1. User A caught user C leaking information to a
third-party. A revokes C’s rights, ensuring that C cannot be given
access by other users in the system.
In this scenario user A had trusted user C in the past, thus issuing
him an authorization, but now A distrusts principal C due the fact
that he has leaked information to a third-party. So A will perform a
P-t-p Global Resilient revocation, and – if she has strong revocation
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right – additionally a Strong Global Resilient revocation, both in
order to remove the authorization she had granted and to forbid as
many other principals as possible to grant new authorizations to C.
SCENARIO 2. User C is leaving to join the rival company. When
user A notices the situation, she preemptively blocks C’s capabili-
ties (but keeping the authorizations previously issued by C).
In this scenario user A had trusted user C in the past, thus issuing
him an authorization. Since C is leaving to the rival company, A
now distrusts C to access files or to newly delegate access right to
others, but since A never misused any rights, A still has trust in the
delegation authorization previously issued by C. So A will perform
a P-t-p Local Resilient revocation and – if possible – a Strong Local
Resilient revocation, in order to remove the authorizations that had
been granted to C and to forbid as many other principals as possible
to grant new authorizations to C, at the same time preserving the
effect of authorizations that C had previously delegated.
SCENARIO 3. User A hears the rumour that user B has re-
ceived a bribe, but A does not know whether the rumour is true.
Upon informing other users, A revokes B’s rights, allowing other
users to re-issue them.
In this scenario, A no longer trusts B since she has heard the rumour
about B, so she will revoke B’s rights. But since A does not know
whether the rumour is true, A allows other users to give the rights
back to B (A will tell others about the rumour and trusts them to
only give the rights back to B if they know the rumour to be false).
So A will perform a P-t-p Global Non-resilient revocation and –
if possible – a Strong Global Non-resilient revocation, in order to
inactivate the previously issued authorizations granted to B, at the
same time allowing other users to newly grant authorizations to B.
SCENARIO 4. User A is revising the authorizations she had
granted in the past. During the process A finds an authorization
to user C, whom A does not remember.
In this scenario user A had trusted user C in the past, thus issuing
him an authorization, but now A neither trusts nor distrusts C, as
she has no recollection of who C is or why the authorization had
been granted. So A will perform a Weak Global Delete in order
to remove the authorization she had granted to C without affecting
authorizations granted to C by other users.
4.2 Desirable behaviour of revocation schemes
When explaining the above scenarios, we referred to the level
and manner of trust or distrust between the revoker and the revokee
in order to motivate the choice of different revocation schemes in
different scenarios. The main novel idea of this paper is to formal-
ize this reasoning about trust, delegation and revocation in such a
way that we can formulate desirable properties that graph-theoretic
definitions of revocation schemes should satisfy. Before we present
this formalization, we will – for the rest of this section – first sketch
the ideas behind this formalization and these desirable properties.
In Section 5, we will define Trust Delegation Logic (TDL), a
logic that allows us to reason about the different levels and man-
ners of trust or distrust that we find in the above four scenarios.
One central idea in this logic is that A grants B the right to further
delegate some right only if A trusts B to make correct judgments
about who should be given that right. By expressing her trust in B
to make correct judgments about something, A commits herselves
to the truth of judgments that she has not made herself, namely
the judgments that B has committed himself to. When A makes a
judgment herself, we say that A has explicit belief in the judgment,
whereas a judgment that A is committed to in the light of a prin-
cipal trusted by A believing the statement is an implicit belief of
A. Trust of principal A in principal B is modelled as A’s belief in
B’s trustworthy. Depending on whether A’s belief is explicit or im-
plicit, we can also call this trust explicit or implicit. For example, if
A expresses trust in B concerning the action of expressing trust in
other principals, and B expresses trust in C, then A explicitly trusts
B and implicitly trusts C.
A further central idea is that a principal A should have access
right of access type α iff the SOA of that object trusts A, either
explicitly or implicitly, concerning access α. Delegation chains
correspond to chains of principals along whom an implicit trust in
some principal can project upwards towards the SOA. A revocation
takes place when at some point along such a chain of principals,
a principal stops trusting in the next principal on the chain, thus
disabling this upward projection of implicit trust.
TDL allows us to model different ways in which a principal can
stop trusting or start distrusting another principal. Some of these
ways have been illustrated in the above four scenarios. The various
revocation schemes correspond to these various ways of stopping
to trust.
Given these explanations, we can now sketch how TDL allows
us to formulate a desirable property for graph-theoretic definitions
of revocation schemes: The graph-theoretic definitions of the revo-
cation schemes should be such that for any given delegation and re-
vocation interaction between the principals, an active authorization
to a principal A should exist in a graph if and only if – translating
the delegation and revocation behaviour to TDL – the SOA believes
A to be trustworthy for the access in question.
5. A LOGIC FOR REASONING ABOUT
DELEGATION AND REVOCATION
In this section we present a logic for formalizing the reasons for
revoking delegations. This logic, which we call Trust Delegation
Logic (TDL), is a first-order multi-modal logic with both classical
negation and negation-as-failure. TDL formalizes both the relation
of trust between principals and the action of announcing one’s trust
in another principal by delegating some right to him/her/it. In de-
veloping TDL, we have taken over some ideas from [4] and [1].
We first define the syntax of TDL. Next we motivate its con-
structs and some of its axioms by sketching how we apply TDL for
modelling delegation and revocation. After that we formally define
the proof theory of TDL, briefly motivating the remaining axioms.
TDL is only defined proof-theoretically, i.e. it does not have a for-
mal semantics, since this is not needed for the application that we
have in mind.
5.1 TDL syntax
There are five types of objects, principal, access, time point, set
of principal-time-pairs and announcement modality. SOA is a con-
stant symbol of type principal, ∅ is a constant symbol of type set
of principal-time-pairs, B, 6B, K and 6K are constants of type an-
nouncement modality, and∞ and all integers are constants of type
time point. scons is a ternary function symbol taking a term of type
principal, a term of type time and a term of type set of principal-
time-pairs, and returning a term of type set of principal-time-pairs.
We use t, t′, t2, t3 as time point variables, i, j, k as principal vari-
ables, Σ,Σ′,Σ2 as variables of type set of principal-time-pairs, α
as an action variable,m as an announcement modality variable, and
x as a variable of arbitrary type. Formulae of TDL are defined by
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the following EBNF rule:
ϕ ::=¬ϕ | ∼ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ϕ) | ∀x ϕ | Tiα | T ti ϕ | TiDα | TiSα |
Bti,Σϕ | Kti,Σϕ | Itimϕ | Rti,Σmϕ | rtia | t > t′ | (i, t) ∈ Σ
We write ϕ→ ψ for ¬(ϕ ∧ ¬ψ), ϕ↔ ψ for (ϕ→ ψ) ∧ (ψ →
ϕ), ∃t > t′ ϕ for ∃t (t > t′ ∧ϕ), and ∃x ϕ for ¬∀x ¬ϕ. We drop
brackets according to usual conventions. If ϕ is of the form ¬ψ, ϕ¯
denotes ψ. Else ϕ¯ denotes ¬ϕ.
While ¬ϕ is the classical negation of ϕ, ∼ϕ is negation as fail-
ure, i.e. ∼ϕ is provable when ϕ is not provable.
∅ refers to the empty set, and given a set Σ of principal-time-
pairs, scons(i, t,Σ) refers to the set Σ∪{(i, t)} (scons stands for set
constructor [9]). The following two axioms model this behaviour
of ∅ and scons:
(∅) ∀i ∀t ¬(i, t) ∈ ∅
(scons) ∀i, j, t, t′,Σ ((i, t) ∈ scons(j, t′,Σ) ↔
(i = j ∧ t = t′) ∨ (i, t) ∈ Σ)
For the sake of readability, we abuse notation by using common
set-theoretic notation in TDL formulas, writing for example
Σ ∪ {(i, t)} instead of scons(i, t,Σ), and {(i, t), (j, t′)} instead
of scons(j, t′, scons(i, t, ∅)).
5.2 Motivating TDL
The formula rtiα intuitively means that at time t, i has access
right of access type α (the object o which may be accessed with
access type α is not made explicit in TDL).
As [4], we make a distinction between belief and strong belief :
A principal who believes ϕ at time t (denoted Bti,Σϕ) has some
justification for ϕ but believes that the justification might be wrong.
A principal i who strongly believes ϕ at time t (denoted Kti,Σϕ) on
the other hand believes that his/her/its justification for ϕ is correct.
The Σ in the subscript of the belief operators indicates whether the
belief is explicit or implicit (see Section 4.2 for this distinction): If
Σ is ∅, it is explicit belief. If Σ is a non-empty set, the belief is
implicit, and Σ indicates the principals who mediate this implicit
belief together with the time points of their beliefs that mediate this
belief. For example, if i trusts j at time t, j trusts k at time t′, and
k believes ϕ at time t2, then i implicitly believes ϕ at time t, and
this implicit belief is mediated by j and k through their beliefs at
time t′ and t2 respectively: Bti,{(j,t′),(k,t2)}ϕ.
Similarly as in [1], the fact that a principal i trusts a principal j on
access α is formalized in TDL by a formula of the form Kti,ΣTjα.
Here Tjα can be read intuitively as “j is trustworthy on access
α”. This way of formalizing the trust relation between two agents
has the advantage of formally clarifying the difference between not
trusting someone and actively distrusting someone, the first being
formalized by¬Kti,ΣTjα (i.e. i lacks a strong belief about the trust-
worthiness of j), and the second by Kti,Σ¬Tjα (i.e. i believes that
j not trustworthy). Furthermore, weak distrust (Bti,Σ¬Tjα) is a
useful formalization for the reserved kind of distrust that we have
in Scenario 3.
TDL allows us to model five different levels of trust between
a principal i and a principal j: Strong trust, where i strongly be-
lieves that j is trustworthy (Kti,ΣTjα), weak trust (B
t
i,ΣTjα ∧
¬Kti,ΣTjα), lack of trust (¬Bti,ΣTjα∧¬Bti,Σ¬Tjα), weak distrust
(Bti,Σ¬Tjα∧¬Kti,Σ¬Tjα), and strong distrust (Kti,Σa¬Tjα). The
distinction between weak trust and lack of trust will not be relevant
for modelling the reasoning about delegation and revocation, but
the distinction between the remaining four levels of trust will be
relevant.
Additionally to trust in someone on an action, the logic can also
express epistemic trust: Kti,ΣT
t′
j ϕ intuitively means that i trusts
j not to make mistakes in judgements about the truth value of ϕ,
if the judgement is made before time point t′. The time point at
which the judgement was made needs to be considered in order to
correctly model local revocations, in which an agent still trusts the
authorizations previously produced by the revokee, but does not
trust new authorizations issued by the revokee (see Scenario 2).
The action of granting to j the right to perform action α is mod-
elled in TDL by the action of publicly announcing one’s trust in j
on action α. Whenever one makes a public announement, the an-
nouncement gets marked as an announcement of belief (B), strong
belief (K), lack of belief ( 6B) or lack of strong belief ( 6K). [4] uses
the letter I for the action of informing someone, which is similar
to the action of public announcement; so we have decided to use
the letter I to denote public announcements: For example, ItiKϕ
intuitively means that i publicly announces its strong belief in ϕ
at time t. ItiKTjα means that i announces its strong trust in j on
action α, and corresponds to i issuing a positive authorization for j
with permission α at time t. Performing a Weak Global Delete re-
vocation for permission α is achieved by the public announcement
Iti 6BTjα, with which i retracts its trust in j by announcing that it
no longer believes j to be trustworthy.
If i wanted to give j the right to give any principal k the right to
perform access α, i could achieve this by publicly announcing its
strong trust in j concerning judgements about the trustworthiness
of other principals: ItiK ∀k T∞j Tkα. If i was trusted by the SOA
to make such an announcement, then j would now be trusted by
the SOA to announce its trust in any principal k on access α, i.e.
to grant the right to perform access α to any principal. However, j
would not yet be permitted to delegate to someone else the right to
grant this right. To give j this right, the i’s announcement would
have to be ItiK ∀k1∞ ∀k2 T∞k1 Tk2α. After this announcement, j
can make an announcement of the form It
′
j K ∀k2 T∞k1 Tk2α, i.e.
j can grant to some principal k1 the right to grant to some further
principal k2 the right to perform access α.
This method can be used to model delegation with an arbitrary
bound on the length for the delegation chain. But both Hagström
et al.’s framework and our refinement of it do not put any bound
on the length of delegation chains. In order to use this method for
modelling delegation with no bound on the length of the delega-
tion chain, we would have to allow principals to make infinitely
many public announcements at once. In order to avoid this compli-
cation, we have introduced a third kind of trust, denoted TiDα.
Its intuitive meaning is that i is trusted to delegate the right to
perform access α. Formally, its intended semantics is that TjDα
should imply every formula in the infinite set {Tjα, ∀k T∞j Tkα,
∀k1T∞j ∀k2 T∞k1 Tk2α, . . . }. This is achieved by the following
axiom governing the behaviour of TiDα:
(TD) TiDα→ Tiα ∧ T∞i TjDα
Using this new kind of trust, we can use the public announcement
IiKTjDα to model i’s issuing a positive authorization for j with
permission D at time t. Iti 6BTjDα models i’s performing a Weak
Global Delete revocation on j for permission D.
Performing a P-t-p Global Resilient revocation can be modelled
by announcing strong distrust in another principal: ItiK¬Tjα or
ItiK¬TjDα. If i explicitly announces its distrust j in this way, i
thereby prevents an implicit belief in the trustworthiness of j to be
passed through i to the SOA. Hence j will need to be connected to
the SOA via some trust chain that is independent of i in order to get
access or delegation right.
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If i’s strong distrust in j corresponds to a p-t-p revocation, what
will correspond to a strong revocation? The answer is that for a
strong revocation i needs to make an announcement that will en-
sure that the SOA does not trust j. For if the SOA is ensured not to
trust j, then j’s rights are blocked, just as after a strong revocation.
Of course, in blocking j’s rights in this way, i will have to make
use of the fact that the SOA has – either directly or indirectly –
granted i the right to perform a strong revocation. As a first attempt
at modelling strong revocation and the right to perform strong revo-
cations in TDL, it therefore makes sense to consider the following
approach (for simplicity, we restrict ourselves to strong revocations
for permission α):
APPROACH 1. ItiK¬Tjα models not only p-t-p revocation, but
also strong revocation. The stronger effect of strong revocation
is achieved by having the SOA believe in i’s judgements of other
principals non-trustworthiness when i has the strong revocation
right. So i’s issuing a positive authorization to j for permission S
should be modelled by i announcing j to be trusted on distrusting
other principals: ItiK∀k T∞j ¬Tkα.
The problem with this approach is that it would lead to blocked
access in some situations where access should be granted. Sup-
pose for example that the SOA grants A strong revocation right,
A grants this right further to B, and B uses this right to issue a
strong negative authorization to C. Furthermore, the SOA grants
simple access right to A, who grants this further directly to C. So
far, C does not have access, since its access is blocked by the strong
negative authorization issued by B. But suppose next that the SOA
globally revokes A’s strong revocation right. Then B also loses its
strong revocation right, so that the negative authorization issued by
B becomes inactive. Hence C should now have access. But with
the above approach, the fact that A granted B the strong revocation
right means that A trusts B on distrusting other principals. Since B
still distrusts C, this would mean that A implicitly distrusts C, so
that C cannot have access based on a trust chain going through A.
To solve this problem, we model i’s performing a Strong Global
Resilient revocation on j for permission α by i announcing that the
SOA should strongly distrust j: ItiK∀t KtSOA,∅¬Tjα. Note that
nested belief modalities are interpreted in a deontic way: Kti,∅K
t
j,∅ϕ
means that i strongly believes that j should strongly believe that ϕ.
Granting i strong delegation right should make i being trusted on
judgements about the SOA’s strong distrust in other principals. In
order to also be able to model performing a Strong Global Resilient
revocation for permission S, we need to introduce a fourth kind of
trust denoted TiSα, for reason similar as the reasons for introducing
TiDα. The intuitive meaning of TiSα is that i is trusted in judge-
ments about the SOA’s strong distrust in other principals; here we
need to allow for public announcements of distrust of various kinds:
¬Tjα, ¬TjDα and ¬TjSα. Furthermore, TiSα should imply that
i is trusted to delegate the right to perform strong revocations, i.e.
to consider another principal k trustworthy for performing strong
revocations. The following axiom captures all this:
(TS) TiSα→ T∞i TjSα ∧ T∞i ∀t KtSOA,∅¬Tjα ∧
T∞i ∀t KtSOA,∅∀k ∀t2 ¬T t2j TkDα ∧ T∞i ∀t KtSOA,∅¬TjSα
A principal i may epistemically trust both a principal who be-
lieves ϕ and a principal who believes ¬ϕ. In such a situation we do
not want i to implicitly hold the inconsistent beliefs that ϕ and that
¬ϕ, because we want implicit belief to stay consistent. Instead, we
want i to implicitly believe neither ϕ nor ¬ϕ. So the principle that
i’s epistemic trust in j concerning ϕ and j’s belief in ϕ together im-
ply i’s implicit belief in ϕ cannot hold without exception. Instead,
we say that if i epistemically trusts j concerning ϕ and j believes
ϕ, then i has a reason to believe ϕ. To deduce that i believes ϕ
from the fact that i has a reason to believe ϕ we additionally re-
quire there to be no reason for i to believe ¬ϕ. In TDL, Rti,ΣBϕ
(respectivelyRti,ΣKϕ) denotes the fact that at time t, i has a reason
to believe (respectively to strongly believe) ϕ implicitly, mediated
by Σ. In order for the absence of a reason for i to believe ¬ϕ to be
provable, it needs to be formulated using negation-as-failure rather
than classical negation: ∼∃Σ Rti,ΣB¬ϕ.
5.3 TDL proof theory
In order to correctly capture the intended functioning of negation-
as-failure in TDL’s proof theory, we need TDL’s deducibility rela-
tion Γ ` ϕ to be defined in such a way that Γ 6` ϕ in general implies
Γ ` ∼ϕ. This can be achieved by defining this deducibility relation
inductively2 as follows:
DEFINITION 5. We define Γ ` ϕ to be the case if one of the
following conditions holds:
• ϕ ∈ Γ
• ϕ is an axiom of TDL
• For some formula ψ, Γ ` ψ and Γ ` ψ → ϕ (modus ponens)
• ϕ is of the form Kti,Σψ and ` ψ (necessitation for strong
belief)
• ϕ is of the form Rti,ΣKψ and ` ψ (necessitation for reasons
for strong belief)
• ϕ is of the form ∼ψ, where ψ is not of the form ∼χ, and
Γ 6` ψ (negation-as-failure)
The axioms of TDL include the axioms of the standard Hilbert
system for first-order logic (as described for example in subchapter
3.6 of [10]) as well as all axioms mentioned in section 5.2 and in
the rest of this section.
The axioms governing the behaviour of the two belief modalities
and their interaction are taken over from Demelombe [4]. Both
belief modalities obey the system (KD):
(KB) Bti,Σϕ ∧Bti,Σ(ϕ→ ψ)→ Bti,Σψ
(DB) ¬(Bti,Σϕ ∧Bti,Σ¬ϕ)
(KK ) Kti,Σϕ ∧Kti,Σ(ϕ→ ψ)→ Kti,Σψ
(DK ) ¬(Kti,Σϕ ∧Kti,Σ¬ϕ)
Furthermore, strong belief satisfies the axiom schema (KT), which
intuitively says that a principal strongly believes that what it strongly
believes is true:
(KT) Kti,Σ(K
t
i,∅ϕ→ ϕ)
Strong belief implies weak belief:
(KB) Kti,Σϕ→ Bti,Σϕ
We need axioms similar to these axioms about the two belief
modalities for the reason-for-belief modality:
(KRB) Rti,ΣBϕ ∧Rti,ΣB(ϕ→ ψ)→ Rti,ΣBψ
(KRK ) Rti,ΣKϕ ∧Rti,ΣK(ϕ→ ψ)→ Rti,ΣKψ
(KTR) Rti,ΣKK
t
i,∅Kϕ→ Rti,ΣKϕ
(RKRB) Rti,ΣKϕ→ Rti,ΣBϕ
2Since Definition 5 is an inductive definition, it can – similarly to
Definitions 2 and 3 discussed in Appendix A – in some contexts
lead to the relation ` being undefined. However, as follows from
the proof of Theorem 1 sketched in Appendix C, Γ ` ϕ is defined
whenever Γ is a set of announcement formulas corresponding to a
authorization specification free of strong S-revocation loops.
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Recall thatBti,ΣB
t′
j,Σ′ϕ is interpreted to mean that i believes that
j should believe that ϕ. It is reasonable to assume that i believes
that someone else should believe ϕ iff i herself believes ϕ. This is
captured by the following four axiom schemas:
(BB1) B
t
i,Σϕ→ Bti,Σ∀t′Bt
′
j,∅ϕ
(BB2) B
t
i,ΣB
t′
j,∅ϕ→ Bti,Σϕ
(KK1) K
t
i,Σϕ→ Kti,Σ∀t′Kt
′
j,∅ϕ
(KK2) K
t
i,ΣK
t′
j,∅ϕ→ Kti,Σϕ
The action of asserting a strong belief is always also considered
an action of asserting the corresponding weak belief, and the action
of denying a weak belief is always also considered an action of
denying the corresponding strong belief:
(IKB) ItiKϕ→ ItiBϕ
(IBK) Iti 6Bϕ→ Iti 6Kϕ
Since the SOA has the ultimate authority over the object in ques-
tion, every principal has the right to perform an action iff it is
trusted by the SOA on that action:
(SOA) rtia↔ ∃Σ KtSOA,ΣTiα
If at time t, i has epistemic trust in j concerning the judgements
about ϕ made before time point t′, this means that if j believes ϕ
at time min(t, t′), i generally has a reason to believe ϕ. However,
this reason to believe ϕ cannot be inferred if j believes ϕ only
implicitly, mediated by the belief of some principal k at time t, and
i has a reason to distrust k concerning judgements about ϕ held at
time t. This is formalized in the axiom schemas of epistemic trust:
(ETB) Bti,∅T
t′
j ϕ ∧ ((t′ > t ∧ t2 = t) ∨ (¬t′ > t ∧ t2 = t′)) ∧
Bt2j,Σϕ ∧ ∼∃k, t3,Σ′ (k ∈ Σ ∧Rti,Σ′B¬T t3k ϕ)
→ Rti,Σ∪{(j,t2)}Bϕ
(ETK ) Kti,∅T
t′
j ϕ ∧ ((t′ > t ∧ t2 = t) ∨ (¬t′ > t ∧ t2 = t′)) ∧
Kt2j,Σϕ ∧ ∼∃k, t3Σ′ (k ∈ Σ ∧Rti,Σ′B¬T t3k ϕ)
→ Rti,Σ∪{(j,t2)}Kϕ
The following axioms govern the relationship between belief and
reason to belief that we already explained at the end of Section 5.2:
(RB) Rti,ΣBϕ ∧ ∼∃Σ′ Rti,Σ′B¬ϕ→ Bti,Σϕ
(RK) Rti,ΣKϕ ∧ ∼∃Σ′ Rti,Σ′B¬ϕ→ Kti,Σϕ
(BR) Bti,Σϕ→ Rti,ΣBϕ
(BR) Kti,Σϕ→ Rti,ΣKϕ
We assume that principals are sincere, in the sense that in gen-
eral a principal believes what he/she/it has previously announced.
However, this principle needs some restrictions: Firstly, a princi-
pal can distance itself from a previous annoncement by making an
announcement with the same content as before but with opposite
announcement modality (e.g., to distance itself from its previous
announcement of belief in ϕ, a principal can announce its non-
belief in ϕ). Secondly, an announcement of weak belief in ϕ can
be made obsolete by an announcement of strong belief in ϕ¯ by a
trustworthy principal. Thirdly, an announcement of strong belief
only implies that the principal has reasons for strong belief; strong
belief can be implied using axiom (RK) in the absence of reasons
for the negation. This is formalized in the sincerity axiom schemas:
(SinB) It
′
i Bϕ ∧ t > t′ ∧ ∼∃t2 > t′ (t > t2 ∧ It2i 6Bϕ) ∧
∼∃j,Σ ∃t3 > t (t > t3 ∧Bt3i,ΣT tj ϕ¯ ∧ It3j Kϕ¯)→ Bti,∅ϕ
(SinK ) It
′
i Kϕ ∧ t > t′ ∧ ∼∃t2 > t′ (t > t2 ∧ It2i 6Kϕ)→ Rti,∅Kϕ
(Sin 6B) It
′
i 6Bϕ ∧ t > t′ ∧ ∼∃t2 > t′ (t > t2 ∧ It2i Bϕ)→ ¬Bti,∅ϕ
(Sin 6K ) It
′
i 6Kϕ ∧ t > t′ ∧ ∼∃t2 > t′ (t > t2 ∧ It2i Kϕ)→ ¬Kti,∅ϕ
We assume that all principals trust themselves, as stated by the
axiom of self-trust:
(ST) Kti,∅Tiα
Since T tkϕ means that k’s judgements made before time point
t about ϕ are trusted, T tkϕ should clearly imply T
t′
k ϕ if t
′ is an
earlier time point than t:
(T t) T tkϕ ∧ t > t′ → T t
′
k ϕ
In order for the binary relation > to function properly in the
logic, we need the following axiom scheme. For any two time point
constants c1, c2 ∈ Z ∪ {∞}, if c1 < c2 in the natural ordering of
Z ∪ {∞} (in which ∞ is larger than any integer), the following
formula is a TDL axiom:
(>) c1 < c2 ∧ ¬c2 < c1 ∧ ¬c1 < c1
6. SCENARIOS IN TDL
In this section we show how TDL can be used to model the rea-
soning about trust and distrust involved in justifying the choices of
revocation schemes in the scenarios from section 4.1.
In order to formalize scenario 3, we need to add some details
to the description of the scenario: Suppose that A is the SOA and
that at time point 1, A grants C delegation right concerning the
access α, i.e. I1AKTCDα. At time 2, C grants B this delegation
right: I2CKTBDα. Later, let’s say at time point 9, A finds out that
C is leaving to join the rival company, and hence now distrusts C
concerning access α or to grant delegation right concerning access
a to anyone else: I9AK¬TCα and I9AK¬TCDα. A also explicitly
denies her previous trust statement to make clear it is no longer
in place: I9A 6KTCDα. But since C never misused any rights, A
still trusts the delegation authorizations issued by C before time
point 9: I9AK ∀k T 9CTkDα. We expect that C loses his access and
delegation rights at time point 9, but that B retains these rights.
We now explain how this expected result is actually attained
in TDL: By axiom (SinK ), I1AKTCDα and the fact that A does
not deny this announcement before time point 9 imply that for
1 ≤ t ≤ 8, KtA,∅TCDα, which by (TD) and (KK ) further im-
plies KtA,∅TCa. Since A = SOA, axiom (SOA) implies r
t
Ca and
rtCDα, i.e. C has access and delegation rights from time point 2
until time point 8. But since I9A 6KTCDα, we cannot deduce r9Ca
and r9CDα in this way: At time point 9, C no longer has access
and delegation right, as expected. However, for 2 ≤ t ≤ 9, we
can deduce rtBa and r
t
BDα, i.e. that B has access and delegation
rights: First, note that for 1 ≤ t ≤ 9 we have KtA,∅ ∀k T 9CTkDα
(which by (KK ) implies KtA,∅T
9
CTBDα). In case 1 ≤ t ≤ 8, this
follows from KtA,∅TCDα, (TD) and (KK ); in case t = 9, it fol-
lows from I9AK ∀k T 9CTkDα and (SinK ). I2CKTBDα and (SinK )
imply that for 2 ≤ t ≤ 9, KtCTBDα, so using (ETK ), we can de-
rive KtA,∅TBDα, which similarly as in the above proofs of rtCa and
rtCDα implies rtBa and rtBDα.
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Here is how the other scenarios discussed in Section 4 can be
formalized in TDL (we assume that the revocation always takes
place at time point 9):
Scenario 1. User A distrusts user C concerning access and del-
egation: I9AK¬TCDα. This implies not only K9A,∅¬TCDα, but by
axiom (KK1) also K9A,∅∀t KtSOA,∅¬TCDα. According to the ex-
planations about strong revocations in section 5.2, if the SOA trusts
A on strong revocations (∃Σ K9SOA,ΣTASα), the latter formula has
the same effect as a Strong Global Resilient revocation.
Scenario 3. The reserved kind of distrust resulting from hearing
a rumour for which one does not know whether it is true is modelled
in TDL as weak distrust, i.e. weak belief in the non-trustworthiness
of the principal in question: I9AB¬TBDα. Since axiom (SinB)
blocks the inference of Bti,∅B¬TBDα from I9AB¬TBDα if some
trusted principal announces trust in j (i.e. delegates to j), I9AB¬TBDα
loses its effect as soon as such an anouncement takes place. Hence
we have the effect of a non-resilient revocation, as desired.
Scenario 4. User A neither trusts nor distrusts user C: I9A 6BTCDα
and IA 6B9¬TCDα. These announcements remove the effect of any
previous announcement made by A about the trustworthiness of
C, i.e. the situation is now practically the same as if A had never
trusted C. This corresponds to a Weak Global Delete, in which a
positive authorization is removed, leaving no trace of it ever having
been there.
7. DESIRABLE BEHAVIOUR OF REVOCA-
TION SCHEMES
In this section we show how TDL can be used to formally for-
mulate a desirable property for a graph-theoretically defined revo-
cation framework. This allows us to study revocation frameworks
using the axiomatic method originating in social choice theory.
There are different revocation schemes because there are differ-
ent reasons for revocating. We start this section by exhibiting a
correspondence between revocation schemes and reasons for revo-
cating formalizable in TDL. The main idea behind the desirable
property of revocation frameworks that we define is that if per-
forming revocation schemes and granting rights was replaced by
publicly announcing one’s formal reasons for revocating or grant-
ing, then these public announcements should logically imply (in
TDL) a principal’s access right iff that principal is actually granted
access based on the delegation graph.
7.1 Matching reasons for revocating to revo-
cation schemes
As explained in Section 5, there are five levels of trust that
an agent can have in another agent, of which four need to be
distinguished in modelling delegation and revocation. But even
when i explicitly strongly distrusts j concerning delegation right
(Kti,∅¬TjDα), i may still trust j’s previous judgements concern-
ing TkDα for other principals k (Kti,∅∀kT tjTkDα). So the level
of trust in another agent concerning delegation right can be
different from the level of trust concerning previously granted
authorizations. However, these two levels of trust are not com-
pletely independent of each other: For example,Kti,∅TjDα implies
Kti,∅∀kT tjTkDα. More generally, the second level of trust must be
at least as high as the first level of trust. This means that only 10 of
the 16 ensuing combinations of trust levels are actually possible.
Table 1 shows which granting-revocation behaviour corresponds
to each of these ten possible combinations of trust levels. Some
cells contain multiple revocation schemes. This means that the
granting-revocation behaviour corresponding to the combination of
trust levels represented by that cell consists of performing multiple
revocation schemes at the same time. For an agent without strong
revocation rights, the granting-revocation behaviour corresponding
to some combination of trust levels is determined by dropping the
strong revocations from the revocations in the cell that represent
that combination of trust levels.
The formulas in the table have p¯i in place of α, Dα or Sα. p¯i is
defined as follows:
DEFINITION 6. For pi ∈ {A,D, S}, we define p¯i by setting
p¯i := α if pi = A, p¯i := Dα if pi = D, and p¯i := Sα if pi = S.
The revocation schemes in the table should always be for the same
pi that is used in the p¯i in the formulas.
We consider the pair of levels of trust that i has in j to be the rea-
son i has for granting a right to j or revoking a right from j. Hence
the graph-theoretic definitions of the revocation schemes should be
such that access is granted whenever this is justifiable on the basis
of these trust-based reasons for granting and revocating. We use
deducibility in TDL as our formal criterion for justifiablity.
These explanations already determine the desirable property for
a set of graph-theoretic definitions of revocation schemes. We now
proceed to formalizing this desirable property.
7.2 Formal desirable property
We first define a set C corresponding to the ten meaningful cells
of Table 1:
DEFINITION 7. C := {(m,n) ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}2 | m ≥ n}.
Next we define a granting-revocation action corresponding to a
cell in the table:
DEFINITION 8. For i, j ∈ S, (m,n) ∈ C and pi ∈ P, define
GR(i, j, (m,n), pi) to be the granting-revocation behavior in the
cell in row m and column n of Table 1 performed by i onto j for
permission pi.
For example, GR(A,B, (2, 2), D) is a Weak Global Delete revoca-
tion from A to B for permission D.
Next we define a public announcement corresponding to a cell
in the table:
DEFINITION 9. For i, j ∈ S, (m,n) ∈ C and pi ∈ P, define
I(i, j, (m,n), pi) to be the set of public announcements by i in trust
in j for permission pi according to the level of trust of row m and
column n of Table 1.
For example, I(A,B, (4, 1), α) is {ItAK∀kT tBTkp¯i, ItAK¬TBp¯i}.
We now need to define the notion of an authorization specifica-
tion resulting from a sequence of granting-revocation-actions.
DEFINITION 10. Given a sequence σ of elements of S × S ×
C × P, we define the authorization specification A(σ) inductively
as follows:
• A(〈〉) = ∅
• A(〈(i1, j1, a1, r1), . . . , (in, jn, an, rn)〉 is the authorization
specification resulting from performing GR(in, jn, an, rn)
onA(〈(i1, j1, a1, r1), . . . , (in−1, jn−1, an−1, rn−1)〉).
Now we need to define which sequences of granting-revocation-
actions are actually valid in our system:
DEFINITION 11. A sequence 〈(i1, j1, a1, r1), . . . , (in, jn, an, rn)〉
of elements of S× S×C× P is called a valid granting-revocation
pattern iff for every k < n, the authorization specification
A(〈(i1, j1, a1, r1), . . . , (ik, jk, ak, rk)〉) is free of strong
S-revocation loops and authorizes i to perform GR(ik, jk, ak, rk).
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Kti,∅∀kT tjTkp¯i
¬Bti,∅∀kT tjTkp¯i ∧
¬Bti,∅∀t′∀k¬T t
′
j Tkp¯i
Bti,∅∀t′∀k¬T t
′
j Tkp¯i∧
¬Kti,∅∀t′∀k¬T t
′
j Tkp¯i
Kti,∅∀t′∀k¬T t
′
j Tkp¯i
Kti,∅Tj p¯i grant permission pi X X X
¬Bti,∅Tj p¯i ∧ ¬Bti,∅¬Tj p¯i WLD WGD X X
Bti,∅¬Tj p¯i ∧ ¬Kti,∅¬Tj p¯i PLN ◦ SLN WGD ◦ PLN ◦ SLN PGN ◦ SGN X
Kti,∅¬Tj p¯i PLR ◦ SLR WGD ◦ PLR ◦ SLR PGN ◦ PLR ◦ SGN ◦ SLR PGR ◦ SGR
Table 1: The correspondence between the revocation framework and reasons for revocating formalized in TDL
The notion of being free of strong S-revocation loops is explained
and formally defined in Appendix A.
The following theorem, whose proof is sketched in Appendix C,
now formally expresses that our refined revocation framework has
the desirable property that we have previously already explained
and motivated:
THEOREM 1. Let n ∈ N, and let σ be a valid granting-revocation
pattern of length n. Then for all i ∈ S, I(σ) |= rni α iff i is the
SOA or there is an active authorization of the form (p, i,+, α, t) in
A(σ).
Note that if we had refrained from implementing in our revised
framework one of the five changes to Hagström et al.’s framework
discussed in section 3.1, the resulting framework would not satisfy
this desirably property.
8. FUTURE WORK
In this paper we studied revocation for a version of delegation
that does not have any bound on the length of delegation chains.
However, TDL lends itself very well also to delegation with such
a bound. Indeed, for this purpose a somewhat reduced version of
TDL, which lacks the TiD and TiS trust operators, would be suf-
ficient. It would be interesting to study the possibility to define a
systematic revocation framework for such bounded delegation that
satisfies a desirable property analogous to the one that our frame-
work for revoking unbounded delegation has been shown to satisfy.
Some reasons for revoking rights cannot be captured in TDL:
User A may revoke B’s rights just because she does not consider
it to be useful for B to have the right in question, even though she
strongly trusts B. And A may choose a certain kind of revocation
scheme based on considerations of responsibility, not just consid-
erations of trust. Our preliminary investigations into this topic sug-
gest that our refined framework also corresponds well to these not
trust-based reasons for revocating, but further investigations are due
in order to develop an extension of TDL that can formalize such
reasons and proof our system to satisfy a desirable property based
on this extended logic.
In order to develop an axiomatic theory of revocation schemes
similar to the application of the axiomatic method in social choice
theory, other desirable properties of revocation schems or revoca-
tion frameworks need to be identified an compared to the desirable
property that we proposed.
9. CONCLUSION
After identifying some problems with Hagström et al.’s [8] re-
vocation framework, we presented a refined framework that avoids
these problems. In order to ensure that our refined framework does
not itself suffer from similar problems, we systematically stud-
ied the relation between the reasons for revocating and the graph-
theoretic definitions of revocation schemes. In order to formal-
ize reasons for revocating based on trust and distrust, we devel-
oped Trust Delegation Logic (TDL). TDL allowed us to formulate
a desirable property that a graph-theoretically defined revocation
framework should satisfy. This desirable property is based on a
correspondence between revocation schemes and reasons for revo-
cating, and requires the revocation schemes to be defined in such a
way that access is granted whenever this is justifiable on the basis
of the reasons for granting and revocating. The main theorem of the
paper asserts that our refined framework does satisfy this desirable
property.
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APPENDIX
A. INDUCTIVE INTERDEPENDENCE OF
DEFINITIONS 2 AND 3
Definitions 2 and 3, in which we define the notions of an autho-
rization being active and being directly inactivated, depend one on
another. This interdependence looks similar to a problematic cir-
cular definition, but can actually be understood as an inductive def-
inition, which can be formally interpreted using the well-founded
semantics [5]. In this appendix we briefly sketch the theory of in-
ductive definitions under the well-founded semantics, and comment
about what practical consequences follow from using an inductive
definition for defining wthe notion of an active authorization.
An inductive definition of predicatesP1, . . . , Pn consists of rules
of the form ∀x¯ P (x¯)← ψ, where P ∈ {P 1, . . . , Pn} and ψ may
itself refer to predicates in {P 1, . . . , Pn}. In such a rule, P (x¯) is
called the head of the rule, and ψ the body of the rule.
An inductive definition may have a form, which makes it impos-
sible to interpret the defined predicates in a way that is consistent
with the rules. For example, the inductive definition {P ← ¬P},
which defined P to be the case if ¬P is the case is problematic: If
we assume P is false, then ¬P is true, so by the single rule of this
definition, P should be true. So P cannot be false. However, since
P is defined through this inductive definition, it can only be true if
some rule in the inductive definition is true. But the only rule in
this definition cannot make P true.
One approach to avoid such problems is to define some syntac-
tic restrictions on the set of rules that ensure that such problems
cannot arise. However, such syntactic restrictions are usually to re-
strictive, barring some inductive definitions that we can intuitively
and formally make sense of.
Another approach to avoid such problems is that of using the
well-founded semantics for inductive definitions, which is a partial
semantics, i.e. for problematic definitions like the above, it does not
define a truth function for the predicates that were purported to be
defined by the inductive definition. But whenever an inductively
defined predicate has an intuitively meaningful interpretation, the
well-founded semantics formally assigns this interpretation to the
predicate [5].
The well-founded semantics is defined through an inductive pro-
cess which involves adding new information about the defined pred-
icates at each step of the induction based on the rules in the induc-
tive definition: This information consists of an assignment of truth
values to domain atoms; a domain atom is a pair (P, a¯) – usually
written as P (a¯) – where P is an n-ary predicate symbol defined
in the inductive definition, and a¯ ∈ Dn, where D is the domain
of the structure. At the first step of the induction, no truth values
are assigned to domain conditions. At every subsequent step, the
truth value t may be assigned to a domain atom P (a¯) if apply-
ing the rules for P to the previous assignment of truth values to
domain atoms establishes that P (a¯) is true; the truth value f may
be assigned to domain atoms P1(a¯1), . . . , Pk(a¯k) if applying the
rules for P1, . . . , Pk to the resulting assignment of truth values to
domain atoms establishes that P1(a¯1), . . . , Pk(a¯k) are false. This
different treatment of the two truth values reflects the inductive na-
ture of the definition, according to which a domain atom can only
be true if some rule makes it true, whereas a domain atom should
be considered false in the absense of a rule making it true. The
well-founded model of an inducive definition is defined to be the
limit assignment of truth values to domain atoms in such an induc-
tion [5]. If the well-founded model does not assign either t or f to
every domain atom of the defined predicates, it is a partial model.
The inductive definition of authorizations being active and di-
rectly inactivated can in some contexts lead to a partial well-founded
model, i.e. to the notions of active and directly inactivated not hav-
ing a coherently determinable meaning. Consider for example the
following authorization specification:
EXAMPLE 8.
A B C
D
+, S, 1 +, S, 2
+
, S
, 3
−
SR , S, 4
If we assume that the negative authorization from D to B is ac-
tive, it directly inactivates the authorization from A to B. But then
there is no active chain of authorizations that supports the autho-
rization from D to B, so it would have to be inactive. If on the
other hand we assume that the authorization from D to B is inac-
tive, then the authorization from A to B is not directly inactivated,
an the chain of authorization from A via B and C to D is active,
thus ensuring that the authorization from D to to B is active. So
either way we run into a contradiction. This means that the inter-
pretation of “active” under the well-founded semantics is partial in
the context of this authorization specification.
In this example, the problem was caused by principal D using its
power to perform strong revocations in order to remove the rights
from B, even though D’s right to perform strong revocations de-
pended on a delegation chain including B. The problem can be
avoided by adding a constraint to the system that disallows prin-
cipals from using their strong revocation right to remove the strong
revocation right from a principal on whom they depend for their
strong revocation right.
This constraint needs to be formulated in both a more formal
and a more general way. For this we first need the notion of a
+−S-chain, which formalizes the notion of a potentially active
chain of positive S-authorizations followed by a strong negative
S-authorization, which can only be inactivated if attacked by an-
other +−S-chain. The time stamp of a +−S-chain indicates the
least time stamp that a positive authorization must have in order not
to be affected by the +−S-chain.
DEFINITION 12. A +−S-chain with time stamp t is a chain
of authorizations (p0, p1,+, S, t1), (p1, p2,+, S, t2), . . . ,
(pn−1, pn,+, S, tn), (pn, pn+1, τ, S, tn+1) satisfying the follow-
ing properties:
• p0 = SOA
• Either τ = −SR and t =∞, or τ = −SN and t = tn+2.
• There are no i, j with 0 ≤ i < j ≤ n such that there is an
authorization (pi, pj ,−PR, S, t′).
• There are no i, j with 0 ≤ i < j ≤ n such that there is an
authorization (pi, pj ,−PN, S, t′) with t′ < tj .
We say that a +−S-chain C1 with time stamp t attacks a +−S-
chain C2 iff C1 ends in a principal that has issued one of the autho-
rizations in C2 at some time t′ > t.
Now the formalized and generalized constraint can be formu-
lated as follows: We require that the +−S-chain in the autho-
rization specification can be partially ordered in such a way that
a +−S-chain C1 attacks a +−S-chain C2 only if C1 < C2 in
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the partial ordering. Informally, this means that there should be
no loops of +−S-chains under the attack relation. An authoriza-
tion specification satisfying this constraint is called free of strong
S-revocation loops.
B. FURTHER REVOCATION EXAMPLES
EXAMPLE 9. Weak Global Delete revocation from B to C
A B C
D E
+, D, 2
+, S, 9
+, A, 1
+
, D
, 4 +
, A
, 5
+
, A
, 1
1
+
, D
, 8
EXAMPLE 10. P-t-p Global Resilient revocation from B to C
A B C
D E
+, D, 2
+, S, 9
+, A, 1
+, D, 6
−PR, D, 10+
, D
, 4 +
, A
, 5
+
, A
, 1
1
+
, D
, 8
EXAMPLE 11. P-t-p Local Resilient revocation from B to C
A B C
D E
+, D, 2
+, S, 9
+, A, 1
+, D, 6
−PR, D, 10+
, D
, 4 +
, A
, 5
+
, A
, 1
1
+
, D
, 8
+, D, 8
EXAMPLE 12. P-t-p Local Non-resilient revocation from B to C
A B C
D E
+, D, 2
+, S, 9
+, A, 1
+, D, 6
−PN, D, 10+
, D
, 4 +
, A
, 5
+
, A
, 1
1
+
, D
, 8
+, D, 8
EXAMPLE 13. Strong Global Non-resilient revocation from B to C
A B C
D E
+, D, 2
+, S, 9
+, A, 1
+, D, 6
−SN, D, 10+
, D
, 4 +
, A
, 5
+
, A
, 1
1
+
, D
, 8
EXAMPLE 14. Strong Local Resilient revocation from B to C
A B C
D E
+, D, 2
+, S, 9
+, A, 1
+, D, 6
−SR, D, 10+
, D
, 4 +
, A
, 5
+
, A
, 1
1
+
, D
, 8
+, D, 8
EXAMPLE 15. Strong Local Non-resilient revocation from B to C
A B C
D E
+, D, 2
+, S, 9
+, A, 1
+, D, 6
−SN, D, 10+
, D
, 4 +
, A
, 5
+
, A
, 1
1
+
, D
, 8
+, D, 8
C. SKETCH OF PROOF OF THEOREM 1
We prove Theorem 1 by first exhibiting a procedure for determin-
ing which authorizations in A(σ) are active, and then exhibiting a
correspondence between statements about the activeness of autho-
rization in A(σ) and statements about the deducibility of certain
TDL formulas from I(σ).
First we need to define the notion of a pi-chain for pi ∈ P:
DEFINITION 13. A pi-chain is a chain of authorizations
(p0, p1,+, pi
′, t1), (p1, p2,+, pi′, t2), . . . , (pn−1, pn,+, pi′, tn),
(pn, pn+1,+, pi, tn+1) satisfying the following properties:• p0 = SOA
• pi′ = D if pi = A, and pi′ = pi otherwise.
• There are no i, j with 0 ≤ i < j ≤ n + 1 such that there is
an authorization (pi, pj ,−PR, pi′′, t′), where pi′′ = pi if j =
n+ 1, and pi′′ = pi′ otherwise.
• There are no i, j with 0 ≤ i < j ≤ n + 1 such that there
is an authorization (pi, pj ,−PN, pi′′, t′) with t′ < tj , where
pi′′ = pi if j = n+ 1, and pi′′ = pi′ otherwise.
Note that a +−S-chain is an S-chain followed by negative S-
authorization.
σ is a valid granting-revocation pattern, soA(σ) is free of strong
S-revocation loops, i.e. there is a partial ordering < on the set of
+−S-chains over A(σ). Since the set of +−S-chains over A(σ)
is finite, < is a well-ordering, and we can perform induction along
<. This allows us to determine which +−S-chains are active: A
+−S-chain C1 is active iff it is not attacked by an active +−S-
chain C2 < C1.
Next we can establish which positive S-authorizations are active:
A positive S-authorization is directly inactivated iff its end node is
attacked by an active +−S-chain. A positive S-authorization is
active iff it is an element of an S-chain whose authorizations are
not directly inactivated.
Next we can establish that a strong negative authorizations is
active iff it starts at some principal at which some active S-chain
ends. This allows us to establish which other authorizations are
directly inactivated: (i, j,+, pi, t) is directly inactivated iff there
is an active authorization (k, j, τ, pi, t′) such that either τ = −SR
or τ = −SN and t < t′. Finally, we can establish that a positive
pi-authorization is active iff it is an element of a pi-chain whose
authorizations are not directly inactivated.
In a similar way as one can show in a step-by-step way the cor-
rectness of this procedure for determining the activeness of autho-
rizations inA(σ), one can prove the following three equivalences:
1. For τ = −SR or τ = −SN, (i, j, τ, pi, t) is active at time t′ iff
I(σ) ` ∃Σ Kt′SOA,ΣTiSα.
2. (i, j,+, pi, t) is directly inactivated at time t′ iff
I(σ) ` ∃Σ Rt′SOA,ΣB¬Tj p¯i.
3. (i, j,+, pi, t) is active at time t′ iff I(σ) ` ∃Σ Kt′SOA,ΣTip¯i
and I(σ) 6` ∃Σ Rt′SOA,ΣB¬Tj p¯i.
The theorem now follows from equivalence 3 together with TDL
axioms (SOA), (RK) and (ST).
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